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Abstract
Parties value unity, yet, members of parliament face competing demands, giving them
incentives to deviate from the party. For members of the European Parliament (MEPs), these
competing demands are national party and European party group pressures. Here, we look
at how MEPs respond to those competing demands. We examine ideological shifts within a
single parliamentary term to assess how European Parliament (EP) election proximity aects
party group cohesion. Our formal model of legislative behavior with multiple principals yields
the following hypothesis: When EP elections are proximate, national party delegations shift
toward national party positions, thus weakening EP party group cohesion. For our empirical
test, we analyze roll call data from the fth EP (1999-2004) using Bayesian item response
models. We nd signicant movement among national party delegations as EP elections
approach, which is consistent with our theoretical model, but surprising given the existing
literature on EP elections as second-order contests.Balancing Competing Demands:
Position-Taking and Election Proximity in
the European Parliament
Party leaders are often considered agents of their parliamentary party faction. Back-
benchers grant leaders power to solve collective action problems both within the parliament
and the electorate | a requirement for successful passage of legislation and reelection (Cox,
1987; Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Aldrich, 1995). Although members of parliament (MPs)
benet from disciplined, highly cohesive parties, political institutions, such as electoral sys-
tems, may create incentives for individual MPs to deviate from the party line to cultivate a
personal vote (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Carey, 2007). To prevent MPs from straying too
far, the leadership is given tools to punish rogue backbenchers and reward those who toe the
line. However, the party leadership must exercise caution when using these tools, as they
may jeopardize electoral chances of individual MPs by forcing them to take positions at odds
with those who elected them. When staking out a party position, the leadership must weigh
the electoral benets of a unied party label against the possibility of losing votes in regions
with underlying ideologies at odds with the party position (Arnold, 1990). Moreover, the
costs and benets to party leaders of reigning in rogue backbenchers are unlikely static over
time. For example, electoral incentives are likely strongest around election time and weakest
in the middle of the term.
However, what happens when there are two sets of party leaders to whom backbenchers
must answer? Who do the rank and le listen to and does this change over time? This
is precisely the problem faced by members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Unlike
members of national parliaments, MEPs are subject to the control of two dierent sets of
party leaders (Hix, 2002). They are elected to the parliament on national lists controlled by
their national parties. But once in the parliament, national party delegations organize into
European party groups. It is the party groups who control committee and rapporteurship
assignments as well as elections to leadership posts within the EP. We argue that the extent
to which these two sets of party leaders exercise control over their MEPs is likely to vary over
time within parliamentary sessions, with national parties exerting the most control around
1election time and EP party groups exerting more inuence in the middle of the term.
Very few studies of legislatures have explored changes in MP behavior over time within
a single electoral cycle (but see Lindst adt and Vander Wielen, 2009). This paper explores
how the voting behavior of MEPs during the 5th parliament (EP5) [1999-2004] changes
over time by treating each year as a separate period of observation. The EP presents a
particularly interesting opportunity to examine partisan constraints on voting behavior over
time because the European party group leaders responsible for ensuring successful passage of
legislation in the EP are dierent from national party leaders who control MEPs' reelection
bids. Moreover, European party group leaders have an incentive to see their MEPs reelected.
After all, these were the MEPs who elected them to leadership positions during the previous
term. The party group leadership may be willing to sacrice party unity to allow MEPs to
follow their national party around election time if this increases MEPs' reelection prospects.
After reviewing the literature on voting behavior in the EP, we present a formal model of
legislative position-taking when MPs are subject to two sets of party leaders, or principals.
To test our theory, we use Bayesian item response models to estimate ideal points from roll
call votes over time within EP5. We nd that the relative strength of party group cohesion
does, indeed, vary across time, specically as a function of national party monitoring. In
particular, European party group cohesion is the strongest in the middle of the term when
the electoral incentives, which are controlled by national parties, are the weakest.
1 Voting Behavior in the EP
Over time the EP has grown from a mere talking shop to a truly powerful parliament with
complex institutional arrangements (Kreppel, 2002). Through the evolution of the EU's leg-
islative procedures, the EP rst gained conditional agenda-setting authority (Tsebelis, 1994)
and eventually veto power (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000). The power of party groups has in-
creased along with the EP's powers. Most studies examining the internal development of the
party group system within the EP have explored the general trend towards the strengthen-
ing of the institution over time, typically by examining party group cohesion (Attina, 1990;
Brzinski, 1995; Raunio, 1997; Hix and Lord, 1997; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007). These
studies, though, have not examined changes in cohesion within a single parliamentary period,
2and therefore they cannot examine how the electoral cycle aects MEP position-taking.1
More recently, scholars have begun to examine how political constraints aect voting
behavior. Members of the European Parliament are often said to be subject to two princi-
pals: their national party controls their electoral chances and careers back home while their
European party group controls their destiny within the parliament (Hix, 2002; McElroy and
Benoit, Forthcoming). While some scholars have argued that national parties are unable to
exert much inuence over their delegation's behavior in the EP (Raunio, 2000), others have
found that national parties can and do inuence MEP behavior depending on the nature of
the electoral system (Bowler and Farrell, 1993; Faas, 2003; Messmer, 2003; Hix, 2004). We
argue that the inuence of national parties on their MEPs should change over time, more
precisely with respect to the location in the electoral cycle.
Given the role of national parties in EP electoral politics, national party leaders have
stronger incentives to monitor their MEPs around election time. Before EP elections, na-
tional party leaders wish to ensure that MEPs do not take a position deviating from the
national party line, which could potentially hurt the party electorally. Following an election,
national parties may pay particularly close attention to new members to see how they behave
in the EP. During the middle of the term, national party leaders may be more willing to
allow the members of their delegation to stray from the home party's position. EP party
group leaders, on the other hand, desire a cohesive party group within parliament to meet
their legislative goals, but they also wish to see the reelection of MEPs who elected them
to leadership. This will improve their chances of retaining a leadership position in the next
term. Therefore, EP group leaders' incentive to monitor voting behavior is strongest around
the middle of the term when electoral incentives are the weakest.2
If the demands of the two principals vary over the course of the electoral cycle, there are
1The only partial exception to this is Hix, Noury and Roland (2007), who examine EP
party group cohesion over time measuring cohesion at six-month intervals. However, they
only report average scores by term for each group. Moreover, they do not examine the trend
in cohesion with regard to the election cycle.
2Our argument mirrors that of Cox and McCubbins (1993) regarding the US Congress.
3two possible MEP voting patterns we could observe. First, both the cohesion of national
party delegations and European party groups could change across time but in opposite
directions, with national delegations most cohesive around elections and party group cohesion
highest in the middle of the term. Alternatively, voting cohesion within national party
delegations may remain stable throughout the parliamentary term; however, whole national
delegations may move away from the positions taken by their national party leadership at
home and towards the EP group in the middle of the term. In this case, only the cohesion
of European party groups, not national party delegations, should change over time. The
second pattern seems the most plausible. Empirical literature on voting behavior suggests
that national party delegations are highly cohesive. Although ideology clearly plays an
important role in MEP voting decisions, often trumping the role of nationality (Kreppel and
Tsebelis, 1999), this ideological divide occurs across national party delegations rather than
within them (Hix, 2002; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007). In other words, ideology explains
voting patterns because the national party delegations within the party groups vote along an
ideological, rather than national, dimension. German Social Democrats and French Socialists
are more likely to vote with one another than with German and French conservatives, but
MEPs within these national delegations still tend to vote as a bloc.
Alternative theories to ours would suggest that the link between MEP voting behavior
and the electoral cycle is tenuous at best. Although recent studies have found that na-
tional parties' views on European integration may aect their electoral chances (Ferrara and
Weishaupt, 2004; Hobolt, Spoon and Tilley, 2009), EP elections are still widely viewed as
second-order contests in which citizens cast protest votes to punish their home governments
(e.g. Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Marsh, 1998; Hix and Marsh, 2007). This literature suggests
that citizens rarely pay attention to European politics and they tend to cast votes along na-
tional rather than European issues. Therefore, we may expect monitoring by national party
leaders to remain consistently low throughout the term. Cohesion of European party groups
may slowly trend upwards over time, even within a single parliament, or it may remain stable
across time.
One might also suspect that national parties monitor their EP delegations more closely
around national, rather than European elections. This, however, is rather unlikely. European
4elections are rarely fought over European issues, and national elections are almost never
fought on European rather than national grounds. Therefore, it seems implausible that
voting behavior in the EP would factor into national election campaigns. Moreover, because
national elections are staggered over the course of the term, any eects of national elections
on voting should wash out in our data and should not eect our results. If anything, they add
noise to the data, making empirical ndings in support for our theory even more impressive.
Current studies of voting behavior in the EP are unable to examine these hypotheses
because they either examine one period in time (Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999; Han, 2007;
Gabel, Hix and Malecki, 2008), or they examine change in voting patterns across parliaments
but not within them (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007). The theory we put forward in this
paper suggests that ideological change should happen within legislative periods as well as
across them.
2 EP Position-Taking Model
To understand the incentives and constraints confronting MEPs when staking out policy
positions, we introduce a utility function for MEPs. This function oers insight into MEPs'
optimal policy positions, taking into account the dual principals, variation in the monitoring
intensity of the national party across time (vis- a-vis elections), and the cohesiveness of the
party groups. While we discuss it with respect to the EP, the model itself is much more
general and could be applied to any legislative setting in which MPs face competing demands.
In the EP, these competing demands come from national parties and EP party groups, but in
other systems they may come from national parties and voters in home districts or national
parties and party activists to give just two examples.
The basis of the utility function is the one-dimensional spatial model.3 The utility func-
3Although empirical work tends to view EU politics as two-dimensional, the exact nature
of the second dimension, and its relationship to the rst dimension, is not clear. Typically
the rst dimension is viewed as a traditional left-right ideological dimension while the second
is treated as an orthogonal dimension related to EU integration (Hix and Lord, 1997; Hix,
Noury and Roland, 2007). Others have argued that the second dimension is related to the
5tion of member j is shown in Equation 1, in which ij 2 ( 1;1) is member j's ideal point,
np 2 ( 1;1) is the ideal point of the national party p to which j belongs, g 2 ( 1;1)
is the ideal point of the party group to which p belongs, Mj(t) is the monitoring intensity





  K (k)(ij   g)
2 (1)
Since national parties must periodically stand for election, there is reason to suspect that
the levels with which national parties monitor their members will vary according to election
proximity. The monitoring intensity function, Mj(t) 2 [0;1), provides for variation in the
levels of monitoring of member j by j's national party, p, across time.4 As the intensity of
monitoring by the national party increases, more weight is placed upon the national party's
ideal point in the utility function. In other words, it becomes more costly for the member
to deviate from the preferences of the national party as Mj(t) increases in value.
Some scholars have suggested that there are dierences across party groups in terms of
their ability to command collective behavior from members (McElroy and Benoit, Forthcom-
ing; Hix, 2002, 690). The cohesion function, K(k) 2 [0;1), is incorporated into the utility
function to account for this possible variation in cohesion across party groups. Increasing
values of the cohesion function amplify the cost of a member's deviation from her party
group ideal point. While certainly not the only factor aecting group cohesion, scholars
widely recognize that group size is inversely related to a group's ability to exact \group-
oriented behavior" from its members (Olson, 1971, 52). Therefore, we theorize that size
of the party group is a central component of the cohesion function. Our current state of
rst (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002). A recent study of MEP ideal points extracted
from roll call votes nds that while the rst dimension is explained by left-right politics,
it is explained by EU integration as well (Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov, 2009). We model
the EP decision-making process in a single-dimensional space, and reduce the likelihood of
multidimensionality in the empirical analysis by examining the party groups separately from
each other.
4p is an integer function of j, yielding the national party to which j belongs.
6knowledge regarding the specic functional relationship between group size and cohesion is
limited, and something we leave for future research. For the sake of this analysis, and a point
of initial investigation, we require only that the function increase in group size. We nd that
functions belonging to the general form C k
 m
j 2 [0;1) eectively satisfy this requirement,
and provide the researcher considerable exibility. In this specication, C 2 [0;1) can be
conceptualized as a group cohesion constant, representing cohesion factors unrelated to party
group size (e.g., group leadership, member preference similarity, etc.), k 2 [1;2;3;:::;1) rep-
resents the number of national parties in j's group party, and m > 0 is an arbitrary constant
determining the magnitude of the group size eect on cohesion. Quite intuitively, K(k) is
monotonically increasing in C and decreasing in k and m, holding other parameters constant.




, interacts the monitoring inten-
sity function with the Euclidean distance between the member's ideal point and the ideal
point of her national party. The second component,  K (k)(ij   g)
2, interacts the cohesion
function with the Euclidean distance between the member's ideal point and the ideal point
of her party group. We operationalize all distances as negative quadratics, which are maxi-
mized at zero. It is important to note that the monitoring intensity and cohesion functions
are permitted to take any non-negative value, and therefore the relative importance of the
party ideal points to the member's utility is determined by the ratio of the values of the
functions. Throughout the subsequent analysis we treat the parameter C in the cohesion
function as a xed constant across all party groups, since we have limited ability to account
for variation in cohesion factors other than with party group size. The maximum possible
value of the cohesion function is, therefore, equal to C, which occurs when k = 1.
Next we derive the optimal position for member j | shown in Equation 2 | by taking
the partial derivative of uj with respect to ij, setting the result equal to zero, and solving
for ij. This equation identies the position in the uni-dimensional space that maximizes
member j's utility function, considering the other constraints discussed above. This optimal








As a basic diagnostic test of the solution in Equation 2, suppose that np = g. Under
7this condition, in which the national party and party group share the same ideal point,
the monitoring intensity and cohesion functions factor out of the equation. Therefore, the
member maximizes her utility by adopting the position shared by her national party and
party group, or i
j = np = g. When we permit the ideal points of the national party and party
group to diverge from one another, the member will select a position located between these
ideal points. The precise location will depend upon the value of the monitoring intensity
function at time t relative to the cohesion function. In the following section, we explore the
implications of this model at the level of both the individual legislator and the party group.
3 Implications of the EP Position-Taking Model
Since the monitoring intensity function is the only parameter in Equation 2 that is allowed to
vary over the course of a parliamentary term, it follows that movement in a member's optimal
policy position, i
j, across time is directly related to the functional form of the monitoring
intensity function. Specically, the distance a member is from her national party position
is inversely related to the monitoring intensity function when np 6= g.5 That is, a member's
optimal position is nearest to her national party's ideal point when the monitoring intensity
function is at its highest level, and closest to the party group ideal point when monitoring
intensity is at its lowest. However, this relationship can, to varying extents, be mitigated by
the cohesion function. Members belonging to small party groups are predicted to remain in
closer proximity to their party group position across time when compared to members from
larger party groups, under conditions of identical monitoring intensity functions. When the
values of Mj(t) and K(k) are equal, the member quite simply adopts the midpoint between
the national party and party group ideal points.
Figure 1(a) demonstrates the movement in optimal positions for two members belonging
to party groups of dierent sizes, in response to an identical monitoring intensity function.
5Although EP group membership is driven by ideology, empirical evidence demonstrates
that national parties commonly take distinctly dierent positions than the party groups to
which they belong (McElroy and Benoit, Forthcoming; Hix, 2002), suggesting that their ideal
points are not perfectly aligned.
8We operationalize time throughout the theoretical analysis as continuous and bounded by
elections. Therefore, elections occur at t = 0 and t = 1 in Figure 1(a). The input values for
the parameters are specied in the gure, and are chosen without loss of generality. Both
members move toward the national party position (np = 1) when the value of the monitoring
intensity function (dotted line) is high, and converge on the party group position (g = 0)
when the value is low. Notably, member 1's optimal position, i
1, remains nearer the party
group position than member 2's optimal position, i
2, throughout the term, since member 1
belongs to a smaller party group than member 2 (k = 5 and k = 20, respectively).
[Figure 1 about here.]
We are chiey interested in exploring how theoretical expectations of monitoring inform
our understanding of movement in members' positions. In order to do so, we must establish
some expectations for levels of monitoring by national parties across time. We theorize
that there is a positive relationship between election proximity and levels of monitoring,
as depicted by the monitoring intensity function in Figure 1(a). National parties should
monitor their MEPs most closely just prior to and just after EP elections. While an intuitive
expectation, it does warrant some discussion.
Even if EP elections are generally thought to matter little for EU politics, national parties
certainly do not simply dismiss them. Because EP elections are often seen as second-order
by-elections, national opposition parties use them to criticize their national government,
while government parties attempt to defend their record. Election outcomes are seen as a
referendum on the government's performance at home and may oer clues about the ability
of the government to survive until the next scheduled election. The British Labour Party's
poor showing in the 2009 EP elections, for example, led to renewed calls for Prime Minister
Gordon Brown to step aside.6 Irish opposition parties even called a motion of no condence
after the Fianna Fail-led government's poor showing in the 2009 EP polls.
Parties wish to stand by their policy goals and project a favorable image to the voting
public, which to some extent relies upon congruence between the national party platform and
6See \European Elections: Brown Faces Leadership Battle Amid Labour Meltdown and
BNP Success." The Guardian, 8 June, 2009.
9the voting record of the national party delegation to the EP. A lack of congruence impedes
the transmission of a clear signal (i.e., the public is less able to discern the party's position
due to the internal heterogeneity of the party), and may convey the image that the party is
unsuited to govern.
Even though EP voting records are not often subject to scrutiny by the media, when a
national delegation deviates from a national party position it may make headlines, especially
as elections approach. In a particularly embarrassing episode for the UK Labour government,
on December 17th, 2008, only a few months before the June 2009 EP election, British Labour
MEPs voted to scrap the UK's opt-out from the working time directive's 48-hour work week
against the wishes of the national party. Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, both of
whom supported maintaining the opt-out, jumped on the opportunity to criticize the Labour
government for its lack of clarity and its inability to control its own MEPs.7 Because parties
generally wish to avoid episodes such as this around election time, we expect national parties
to exert the highest monitoring levels just before elections.
National parties should also monitor their EP delegations closely just following elections.
When new MEPs win seats, the national party will wish to see how they behave in the
parliament. The media and organized groups may pay more attention for the rst few months
of a new term. They may wish to monitor the behavior of new parties that recently entered
parliament, for example. Meanwhile, national parties will maintain high levels of monitoring
when they feel the spotlight is still on the new EP. As the work of the new parliament
proceeds, though, the need of the national party to constantly monitor its delegation will
diminish. Monitoring levels, therefore, should be lowest in the middle of the term.
It is important to note that our expectation for high monitoring levels immediately follow-
ing elections are more tentative then our expectation for high monitoring levels immediately
preceding elections. We generally speculate that MEPs are under greater scrutiny following
elections (vis- a-vis external scrutiny) than the middle of the term, but there is less theoreti-
cal guidance to this eect then exists for the speculation that monitoring intensity is higher
7See \Britain's opt-out from the 48-hour working week set to be scrapped." The Daily
Telegraph, 18 December, 2008.
10preceding elections compared to the middle of a term. It is conceivable that the changes
in monitoring intensity that occur in the rst half of a term are minimal (or completely
absent). Moreover, the precise relationship between monitoring levels pre- and post-election
also remains somewhat ambiguous. Intuition alone might suggest that monitoring levels
preceding elections will be higher than those following elections, given the immediacy of
consequences. Therefore, our expectation of a parabolic monitoring intensity function must
be accompanied by the caveat that this expectation is stronger for the latter portion of a
term.
What does this behavior imply for the dispersion of member positions within party
groups? Should there be any dierences in the ideal points of the national parties that
constitute a party group | such dierences are often observed and in the most severe cases
lead to party group switching (McElroy and Benoit, Forthcoming) | movement by party
group members toward their respective national party position will inherently diminish party
group cohesion. National parties with views farthest from the center of the party group are
expected to move the most. Since we theorize that monitoring intensity by national parties
is highest when elections are near, party group cohesion will be inversely related to election
proximity, as national party delegations with positions at variance with their EP party
group position move away from the EP party group and towards their national position.
By extension, there are more opportunities for dierences across the positions of national
parties as the number of national parties within a party group increases, contributing to
higher dispersion of member positions for larger party groups. This is merely one of the
many reasons that increasing group size complicates the ability of group leadership to compel
collective behavior. Thus, we arrive at the following proposition and corollary.
Proposition for Party Group Cohesion Relative to Elections
Party groups will have the least cohesion (highest dispersion of member positions)
when elections are proximate and the greatest cohesion (lowest dispersion of
member positions) when elections are distant.
Corollary
As the number of national parties that comprise a party group increases, the
cohesion of that party group will decrease (i.e., the dispersion of member positions
will increase with group size).
11Figures 1(b) and 1(c) illustrate these predictions for dierent specications of parabolic
monitoring intensity functions, in which party group 1 (EPG1) is smaller in size than party
group 2 (EPG2). While the functional forms of the predicted dispersion dier across the
dierent monitoring intensity functions, as we would expect, the proposition and corollary
hold.
4 Testing the EP Position-Taking Model
We empirically test our theoretical model using roll call vote data from the fth EP (EP5).
Not only is EP5 the most recent parliament for which complete roll call data is available, it is
also the last parliament prior to Eastern enlargement. As the EP has consistently increased
in both its power and its level of institutionalization, using data from a recent parliament
oers the best test of our theory. However, our theory also requires that national parties
and their members possess a sophisticated understanding of EP electoral politics, something
most likely learned over time. For this reason, MEPs from new member states just entering
parliament may not immediately conform to our theoretical expectations. Therefore we feel
the 5th EP data oers a better test than would data from the 6th EP.8
We rst calculate party group cohesion scores and then we estimate MEP ideal points
using a one-dimensional Bayesian item-response (IRT) model. To calculate cohesion scores
and ideal points across time, we have divided the roll calls by year. Accordingly, the rst
year in our data extends from July 1999 to June 2000, the second year from July 2000
to June 2001, the third from July 2001 to June 2002, the fourth from July 2002 to June
2003 and the fth from July 2003 to June 2004. The use of roll call votes to examine
ideology in the European Parliament is certainly not uncontroversial. Some scholars have
examined selection bias in roll calls and have found that when not all votes are recorded,
using roll calls can lead to biased estimates of ideology and cohesion (Carrubba et al., 2006;
Carrubba, Gabel and Hug, 2008; Hug, Forthcoming). In the EP approximately one third
of all votes are roll calls. The remaining two thirds are taken either by a show of hands
8The data is available from Simon Hix's website at http://personal.lse.ac.uk/HIX/
HixNouryRolandEPdata.HTM.
12or by electronic vote where the outcome of the vote is recorded but not the way individual
MEPs voted. Nevertheless, we feel roll calls represent the best data available for testing our
theory. Other means of estimating ideology, such as expert surveys of party group positions
(McElroy and Benoit, 2007), national parties (Steenbergen and Marks, 2007) or surveys of
MEPs themselves (Farrell et al., 2006) do not oer sucient variation over time. Proksch
and Slapin (Forthcoming) have used speeches to estimate positions of national parties in
the European Parliament, however they nd a strong national component to speech which
is likely related to the institutional incentives of MEPs to make speeches. Selection eects
may be even stronger for speech data than for vote data and are less well understood. Thus,
we opt to use roll call votes to examine our claims.
Moreover, the shortcomings of roll call analysis articulated in the aforementioned schol-
arship appear not to bias our analysis. We concur with these scholars that roll calls may
lead to imperfect estimation of legislators' sincere preferences, as roll calls are unlikely to be
a random sample of all votes. However, there is little reason to suspect that this imprecision
in estimation would advantage our theory, since it seems improbable that this bias is time-
dependent. This study is principally interested in examining change in ideal points across
a parliamentary term, and therefore we should be cautious of using roll call analysis if it
is likely to result in nding greater cohesion when elections are near. If party groups that
request roll call votes are likely to exhibit greater cohesion than they would under other vot-
ing methods, as suggested by Carrubba, Gabel and Hug (2008), then we should look to the
frequency of roll call votes across the term to explore the appropriateness of this approach.
In fact, there is remarkable consistency in the number of roll calls across the years. For
instance, the dierence in the number of roll calls between the third and fth year of EP5
(the years with the greatest predicted dierence in cohesion) is merely 19 (1219 in the third
year and 1236 in the fth). Thus, we opt to use roll call votes to examine our theoretical
claims.
4.1 Agreement Indices
As a rst cut at identifying potential dierences in EP party group cohesion across time,
we calculate Agreement Indices (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2005) for each of the major party
13groups and each year. The formula for the Agreement Index, as explained in Hix, Noury
and Roland, is as follows:
AIi =
maxfYi;Ni;Aig   1=2[(Yi + Ni + Ai)   maxfYi;Ni;Aig]
Yi + Ni + Ai
; (3)
where Yi represents the number of Yea votes, Ni the number of Nay votes and Ai the
number of abstentions on vote i. The index equals 1 when all members of a group vote
in the same manner, and it equals 0 when their votes are equally divided among the three
choices. We calculated Agreement Indices for every party group and every roll call vote
by year. Thus, for every party group we have ve (one for each year) Agreement Index
distributions based on the total number of roll call votes in the corresponding year. We used
those distributions to calculate the median Agreement Index and 95% condence intervals
for each year and party group. These results are presented as bar plots in Figure 2, with
year graphed on the x-axis and the Agreement Index on the y-axis. The bars represent the
median Agreement Indices and the whiskers span the 95% condence intervals, calculated
with the standard errors from the distributions of annual party group cohesion scores. Based
on our theoretical model, we expect that party groups will be most cohesive in the middle of
the term. Immediately following an election, we expect cohesion to be low, slowly increasing
and reaching a maximum in the middle of the term and then decreasing to reach another
low in the last year.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 2 provides some initial evidence in favor of our theoretical predictions, especially
when we focus on the changes from years 1 to 3 and years 3 to 5. In fact, for the four
largest party groups | the Socialists (Party of European Socialists - PES), the Conservatives
(European Peoples Party - EPP), the Liberals (European Liberal Democrats - ELDR), and
the Greens | one-sided t-tests conrm that there are statistically signicant dierences
across years 1, 3 and 5. For these four party groups, cohesion is signicantly higher in year
3 than in year 1 and signicantly lower in year 5 than in year 3.
The smaller party groups, such as the right-wing group Union for Europe of the Nations
(UEN) and the left-wing European United Left/Nordic Green Left (EUL), appear to show a
14monotonic increase in party group cohesion over the course of EP5.9 This suggests that the
national parties within these smaller, fringe party groups may have been employing dierent
monitoring functions than the national parties belonging to the four larger, more mainstream
party groups. In addition, these party groups had the lowest overall Agreement Index scores
at the beginning of the term and, therefore, had little place to go but up. For these reasons,
the remaining analysis focuses solely on the four largest groups. Moreover, outside of the
four largest party groups, membership size for the remaining party groups is too small for
meaningful regression analysis, which is at the core of our empirical test of the electoral
connection (see below). It is important to note, though, that the four largest groups we
consider in our subsequent analysis make up 82% of the EP membership.
4.2 Bayesian Ideal Point Analysis
Next, we take a more rened approach to examining changes in party group cohesion. Specif-
ically, we use a Bayesian item-response theory (IRT) model to estimate ideal points for each
year and MEP in EP5. The great advantage of this method over the Agreement Index is
that it lets us assess changes in cohesion more accurately. While the Agreement Index only
accounts for the extent to which party group members vote similarly on individual votes, the
IRT model generates estimates for the actual position of each MEP. Thus, we can accurately
account for the dispersion of individual members within a party group. This is not possible
with the Agreement Index. Stated dierently, from the Agreement Index, we cannot recover
the actual dispersion of MEP ideal points. For example, a low Agreement Index could be the
result of either an ideal point distribution with relatively large dispersion or a distribution
with relatively low dispersion. This uncertainty is resolved by using the roll call votes to
estimate ideal points.
There are several reasons to use a Bayesian IRT model to estimate MEP ideal points.
Since we are interested in variation within a legislative term, we cannot rely on the well-
known Nominate estimates of Hix, Noury and Roland (2007), which have only been estimated
9We do not examine the Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD) group due to the
fact that they only held 16 seats.
15for entire EP terms. Moreover, these (W-)Nominate scores are not comparable across time.
There is also a strong argument for using Bayesian IRT models over DW-Nominate (Poole
and Rosenthal, 1997), the dynamic version of Nominate. As several authors before us have
pointed out, the DW-Nominate estimation procedure assumes a linear trajectory for indi-
vidual ideal points across time, which we believe is quite a restrictive assumption (Clinton,
Jackman and Rivers, 2004). The Bayesian IRT model that we use here does not make that
assumption but rather allows ideal points to move in any pattern across time. In our re-
search on the U.S. Senate we show that forgoing the linearity assumption inherent to the
DW-Nominate model makes an important dierence to inference and conclusions one can
draw about ideal point change (Lindst adt and Vander Wielen, 2009).
For the ideal point analysis, the roll call data can only contain zeros, ones and missing
values. We follow Hix, Noury and Roland's (2007) convention of coding present but did not
vote, absent and not an MEP as missing, no and abstain as zero and yes as one for absolute
majority votes. The coding for simple majority votes is identical, except that abstain is
coded as missing rather than a no vote. Aside from the coding, however, our approach is
quite dierent from that of Hix, Noury and Roland. While they are interested in estimating
MEP ideal points for purposes of exploring relative positioning both across EP members
and party groups, our main interest is in assessing the variation of cohesiveness within party
groups across time. For that reason, we choose to estimate MEP ideal points separately for
each of the major party groups rather than in a single model, thereby signicantly reducing
the computational burden. This approach allows us to compare ideal points of MEPs from
within the same party group, but not across party groups. In other words, we can no
longer say whether the Socialists are more centrist than the Greens; but given our primary
interest in party group cohesion rather than ideal point comparison across party groups,
our approach is justied. Moreover, estimating group positions separately helps eliminate
concerns that positions vary over time with respect to other groups as a result of legislative
coalition formation. The entire Socialist group may move to the center during the middle
of the term to form a legislative coalition with the Conservative group, but so long as the
Socialists move as a monolithic bloc, our results will not be aected. To reiterate, we are
only interested in dispersion of ideal points within party groups and not their positional
16relationship to other party groups.
As a result, we have four data sets, one each for the largest EP party groups - the
Socialists, the Conservatives, the Liberals and the Greens. For each of the party groups,
we drop all MEPs who did not vote at least 25% of the time in each of the ve years.10
We follow Hix, Noury and Roland's (2007) approach by dropping roll calls on which 97%
or more of the MEPs are in agreement. This greatly reduces the number of votes for each
party group, which further reduces computational burden. Again, this is unproblematic as
votes with high levels of agreement among party group members oer very little information
for purposes of discriminating among members and their ideal points.
The nal data set for the Socialists contains 161 legislators and 412 roll calls in the rst
year, 332 roll calls in the second, 368 roll calls in the third, 443 roll calls in the fourth and
419 roll calls in the fth year. Similarly, the relevant numbers for the Conservatives are 200
legislators and 485, 518, 541, 520 and 677 roll calls, for the Liberals 43 legislators and 498,
526, 467, 480 and 623 roll calls, and nally for the Greens 41 legislators and 302, 256, 290,
208 and 260 roll calls. For each of the party groups, we hold the ideal points of two MEPs
constant across time.
There are dierent ways for estimating ideal points that are comparable across time in an
IRT framework, but a particularly straightforward and easily implemented technique is to
estimate a quasi-dynamic model. We illustrate the method with reference to the Socialists.
The procedure is the same for the three remaining party groups. For the Socialists, we rst
generate a 7951974 matrix of missing values and then place the annual roll call data on
the diagonal of that matrix. As a result, we treat the annual observations for an individual
MEP as if they came from dierent individuals. Thus, we essentially have 1595 MEPs.
However, MEP 1.1 (MEP 1 in year 1) has votes recorded only for year 1 and missing values
for all of the other years, and MEP 1.2 has votes recorded only for year 2 and missing values
10Estimation of ideal points for MEPs who participate in few votes results in extremely
inaccurate and unreliable posterior estimates. Dropping those members from the analysis
is therefore a common approach in ideal point research (see for instance Hix, Noury and
Roland, 2007).
17for all of the other years, etc. Consequently, the estimations yield ve ideal points for each
MEP (the exception being the constant members; see below).
For these ideal points to be on the same scale, and, therefore, comparable across years,
we must make one additional assumption, namely that the ideal points of some members
are constant across years. This might seem to be a somewhat odd assumption to make in
an analysis that specically looks at ideal point change across time, but (i) it is essential for
guaranteeing comparability of ideal points across time, (ii) less problematic than the alterna-
tive of identifying the scale by xing roll calls (which is better with time-invariant estimations
but inappropriate here), and (iii) it still allows us to make inference about movement for all
of the non-constant MEPs. We take an additional precaution by holding constant members
from the party group leadership, as these members are less likely inuenced by national
party monitoring, and therefore less likely to shift positions over time. Party group leaders
tend to be accomplished senior politicians who will not wish to return to jobs in national
politics. They are also less likely to be moved down the party list at election time. There-
fore, they are less susceptible to pressures from the national party to toe the national party
line. For each party group, we anchor the ideal point scale with two party leaders with high
vote participation rates who fall on opposite sides of the party group's ideological spectrum
(which we identied using the rst-dimension W-Nominate scores provided by Hix, Noury
and Roland (2007)).11
11It is important to note again that we hold these anchors constant across the ve years
and that we impose inequality constraints on their ideal points to identify the scale. We
therefore still estimate ideal points for these members but constrain them to be on one
side (positive or negative) of the scale for the entire period of analysis. For the Socialists,
we constrain the ideal point of Torben Lund (Denmark) on the left and Robert Goebbels
(Luxembourg) on the right. Both are party group Vice-Chairmen. For the Conservatives,
we use Fran coise Grosset^ ete (Vice-Chairwoman from France) as the left anchor and James
Elles (Vice-Chairman from the UK) as the right anchor. The anchors for the Liberals are
Graham Watson (left anchor; Chairman from the UK) and Paavo V ayrynen (right anchor;
Vice-Chairman from Finland). Finally, for the Greens, we use Paul Lannoye (left anchor;
18The model that we estimate is the standard one-dimensional Bayesian IRT model (see
Clinton, Jackman and Rivers, 2004). The model is estimated using Gibbs sampling and
implemented as part of the MCMCpack package (Martin, Quinn and Park, 2009) in R (R
Development Core Team, 2009). The specic MCMCpack function we use is MCMCirt1d. The
nal model takes the following form:
p(;;jV) / p(Vj;;)p(;;); (4)
where:





s2Sb (b + bs)vb;s(1   (b + bs))1 vb;s is the likelihood
function.
In Equation 4,  refers to the diculty parameters,  to the discrimination parameters,
and  to the ideal points (subject abilities). For each of the four estimations, we set the
number of burn-in iterations at 200,000 and the number of MCMC iterations at 2,000,000,
saving every 200th iteration for a total of 10,000 posterior ideal point estimates for each
MEP. In the next section, we discuss the results of the ideal point estimations.
5 Results
Graphical examination of the parameters as well as other diagnostic tests indicate that the
estimates have reached stationarity and have likely converged.12 As before, we are interested
Chairman from Belgium) and Heide R uhle (right anchor; Vice-Chairwoman from Germany).
The constant members and their corresponding roll calls are appended to the roll call matrix.
The corresponding nal matrices used for the ideal point estimations are of size 7971974
for the Socialists, 9922741 for the Conservatives, 2072594 for the Liberals, and 1971316
for the Greens.
12We primarily relied on Geweke's convergence diagnostic, as implemented in the coda
(Plummer et al., 2009) package in R (R Development Core Team, 2009).
19in the spatial contraction and expansion of EP party group ideal point distributions across
years. Rather than plot MEP ideal points, we begin by constructing barcharts of the standard
deviations of ideal points within each party group by year. We illustrate the procedure taking
the Greens as an example. The procedure is the same for the other party groups.
After eliminating members that did not participate in a sucient number of roll calls,
there remain 41 members in the party group. Of those 41 members, we selected two (see
above) whose ideal points we held constant across the ve years of EP5 in order to anchor
the ideal point scale. To calculate the standard deviations for the Greens for each year and
to account for the uncertainty of the ideal point estimates, we repeatedly conduct random
draws of ideal points from the posterior distribution. Specically, for year 1, we randomly
draw an ideal point estimate for each of the 39 non-constant members of the Greens and
then calculate the standard deviation from the distribution of those ideal points. We then
repeat that process 1,000 times. The result is a distribution of standard deviations of size
1,000 for year 1. From that distribution, we calculate the median standard deviation and
95% Bayesian credible intervals. We then do the same for years 2 through 5. The process is
the exact same for the other three party groups.
We graph the results in Figure 3, plotting year on the x-axis and the standard deviation
on the y-axis for each of the four largest party groups. The gray bars represent the median
standard deviation, and the whiskers span the 95% Bayesian credible intervals. From Figure
3, we can see that all of the major party groups, with the exception of the Greens, follow
the pattern suggested by our theoretical model. The Socialists, Conservatives and Liberals
all exhibit the U-shaped pattern across the ve years shown in Figures 1(b) and 1(c).
[Figure 3 about here.]
The results are most impressive for the Socialists and the Conservatives, for which the
95% Bayesian credible intervals of years 1 and 3 as well as 3 and 5 are far from overlapping.
While the trend for the Liberals is in accordance with our theoretical model, there is a
little bit of an overlap in the credible intervals for years 1 and 3 as well as years 3 and 5,
although the credible interval for year 4 is distinctly dierent from years 1 and 5. Given
the general parabolic shape of across-year dispersion for the Liberals in Figure 3, there is
20sucient evidence to conclude that the Liberals as well behave in a manner consistent with
our theoretical model. Yet, it is important to note that the year-to-year changes are not
always completely aligned with the theoretical predictions for the Liberals. While the results
for the Greens are less conclusive, the overall conclusion from the standard deviation analysis
is that our theoretical model fares extremely well in predicting patterns of cohesion across
time for the major party groups: When elections are proximate, party group cohesion will
tend to be lowest.
The results from the standard deviation analysis also give impressive support to our
corollary claim, which posits that party group dispersion will increase with group size. It is
noticeable that the standard deviations for the Socialists and the Conservatives are larger for
most years and have a much greater range than do the standard deviations for the Liberals
and the Greens, closely resembling the comparison of EPG1 to EPG2 in the theoretical
Figures 1(b) and 1(c). The Greens, the smallest party group, are the most cohesive, followed
by the second smallest group, the Liberals. The larger party groups are also correctly
ordered according to our theoretical model. The Socialists, the second largest group, are
much less cohesive overall than the smaller party groups, but are generally more cohesive
than the Conservatives, the largest EP party group. Given these patterns, which are perfectly
consistent with our corollary, it is not surprising either that the two smallest party groups
oer the weakest support for our main proposition. Since these are the party groups predicted
to exhibit the greatest cohesion across time, nding sucient variation in dispersion to reject
the null hypothesis of no change constitutes a particularly high bar.
At this point, we have only shown that there is indeed contraction and expansion of
ideal point distributions across years that is consistent with our theoretical model. Figure
3 suggests that there is a maximum amount of insulation from electoral pressures in year
3 and a minimum in year 5. However, contraction and expansion in and of themselves do
not provide conclusive evidence that the cohesion patterns are driven by electoral factors
in general or that they are the result of national party monitoring in particular. The best
approach to uncovering possible electoral eects is to regress our ideal point estimates on a
measure of national party positions, while at the same time accounting for nonlinear time
dynamics.
21Thus, we estimate four OLS regression models, one for each major party group, in which
the dependent variable is the absolute distance between a MEP's ideal point and the mean
position of her party group in that year. The independent variables include year (ranging
from 1 to 5), year-squared, the position of the MEP's national party on EU integration
and two interaction terms between year and national party position as well as year-squared
and national party position. For the national party position measure, we rely on an expert
survey conducted by Hooghe et al. (2008). The variable has seven categories, ranging from
1 (strongly opposed to European integration) to 7 (strongly in favor of European integra-
tion). The regression model takes the following form, where j is the individual's ideal point
estimate in year j,  j is the mean ideal point of the MEP's party group in year j and NP is
the position of the individual's national party on EU integration as measured by the Hooghe
et al. (2008) expert survey.
jj    jj = 0 + 1Year + 2Year
2 + 3NP + (5)
1Year  NP + 2Year
2  NP + ;
for j = 1;:::;5
Given our theoretical prediction, we expect that MEPs' deviations from the mean party
group position will be greatest when elections are proximate and national party preferences
trump party group preferences. The least amount of deviation is expected to occur in
the middle of the ve-year EP term, when electoral insulation is greatest and MEPs are
relatively free to focus on party group preferences. Moreover, we expect that MEPs whose
national parties are highly favorable of EU integration have little reason to deviate from
the party group position throughout the term, whereas MEPs from national parties who are
more opposed to EU integration are more likely to show substantial movement across time.
This is especially true for the members of the two largest party groups | the Socialists
and Conservatives | as these groups are generally very pro-integration. Specically, in a
graphical display of levels of MEP deviation from their mean party group ideal point, we
would expect MEPs from EU-skeptical parties to exhibit an across-time pattern resembling
an upward-opening parabola, while we would expect a relatively at pattern for MEPs from
22EU-enthusiastic national parties.
Of course, simply using the mean ideal point estimates as the dependent variable for our
regression would neither be in the spirit of our Bayesian approach nor would it account for
the uncertainty about the ideal point estimates. Consequently, we use a similar approach to
the one employed for the standard deviation analysis. We rst randomly draw, by year, an
ideal point estimate for each of a party group's non-constant members and then calculate
the absolute mean distance from the mean party group estimate for that particular sample.
We repeat that process 100 times.13 Subsequently, we estimate the regression in equation
6 by party group for each of the 100 draws, giving us 100 separate regression estimates for
each group. This method straightforwardly accounts for the uncertainty surrounding our
ideal point estimates.
We proceed to present the results of the regression analysis by plotting predicted values
with condence intervals for each of the 100 draws and each party group. Figures 4, 5, 6 and
7 show the resulting graphs. In each of the four graphs, the predicted values for the absolute
mean ideal point estimation are plotted on the y-axis and year on the x-axis. The black lines
represent the regression curves when the national party position is set at the minimum value
within the respective party group (indicating less support for EU integration). The gray
lines represent the regression curves when the national party position is set at the maximum
value within the respective party group (indicating the most support for EU integration). In
both cases, the middle curves represents the mean estimate and the upper and lower curves
form the 95% condence intervals.
[Figures 4 and 5 about here.]
From Figures 4 and 5, we can see that the two major party groups show the patterns
we would expect from electorally motivated contraction and expansion. In both cases, as
expected, MEPs from national parties with low support for EU integration (black curves)
display maximal deviation from the mean party group ideal point right before and right
13We also did this with 1,000 draws, but graphical representation of a sample of that size
is entirely impractical. Of course, in both cases, the draws were random, which is why |
not surprisingly | the results are practically identical across the large and the small sample.
23after elections and minimal deviation in the middle of the EP term. MEPs from pro-EU
integration national parties (gray curves), on the other hand, show very little variation across
time for the Conservatives and the Socialists. In addition to displaying a parabolic shape,
members from more Euro-skeptic national parties have greater absolute deviations from the
mean of the party group in all years. When national parties are supportive of EU integration,
they have less need to closely monitor their MEPs because their national party position is
likely more similar to that of the party group.
[Figures 6 and 7 about here.]
We do not observe the same patterns for the smaller party groups | the Liberals (Figure
6) and the Greens (Figure 7) | but as pointed out in our discussion of the standard devi-
ation patterns, there is reason to believe that there are other mechanisms at work here. In
particular, as we suggest in our corollary, smaller party groups might generally have less of a
problem with large swings in cohesion, since the party group leadership is in a better position
to closely monitor the relatively small membership and fewer (potentially divergent) prefer-
ences comprise the party group. Not only is the across-time variation in cohesion relatively
at for the Liberals and the Greens, but the size of the mean deviations are generally smaller
for these party groups than they are for the Socialists and the Conservatives, a nding that
is consistent with our theoretical model.
In conclusion, we nd strong evidence for our theoretical predictions. Not only is there
contraction and expansion in ideal point distributions over the years, but these patterns
can be directly explained by national party monitoring as elections approach. The patterns
of ideal point movement are remarkably strong for the two largest party groups, which
together represent 66% of the total EP membership and consist of the largest center-left and
center-right national parties from across Europe. And the weaker evidence of election-related
movement occurs among the smaller party groups as predicted by the theoretical model.
6 Conclusion
MEPs face competing incentives from national party and party group leaders. There are
strong theoretical reasons to believe that the inuence these two principals assert is not
24constant across a single parliamentary term. Yet research on ideological position-taking and
cohesion within the EP has assumed that shifts only occur across parliamentary periods
rather than within them. We have presented a formal model to demonstrate how MEPs
facing two principals shift their ideological positions over time as constraints imposed by
these principals change. We nd strong evidence that EP party groups are most cohesive
during the middle of the parliamentary term and least cohesive around election time. This
is because national party delegates within a party group move en bloc towards each other
during the middle of the parliamentary term.
Our ndings are particularly interesting in light of the literature on the second-order
nature of EP elections. Even though the public does not seem to know or care much about
European politics and elections, national parties and party groups shape the behavior of
their MEPs on the oor of parliament as if MEP behavior would have an electoral impact.
Parties may worry that the public will start to pay attention, or that opposing parties will
attempt to take advantage if their MEPs cast public votes that are out of line with the
national party position.
The approach we take here has implications beyond the EU. The theoretical model can be
used to study legislative position-taking in any political system where MPs face competing
demands. MPs, for example, may be caught between party leaders in charge at the national
level and party activists responsible for candidate selection at the local level. In systems
with single member districts, the position of the national party may not be the same as the
position of the median voter in an MP's district, again leading MPs to attempt to balance
these competing demands. Future research is required to both further investigate our claims
regarding EU politics and to extend the model to other political systems.
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Figure 1: Theoretical Predictions. Panel (a) displays optimal
ideal points for two MEPs from party groups of dierent sizes,
under conditions of identical monitoring intensity functions
and input values listed in panel. Panels (b) and (c) display
dispersion predictions comparing two party groups in which
party group 1 (EPG1) is smaller in size than party group 2
(EPG2). Panels (b) and (c) dier in the specication of the
parabolic monitoring intensity function.


















































































































































































Figure 2: Agreement Indices for EP Party Groups. Agree-
ment Indices, plotted on the y-axis, were calculated using
Hix, Noury and Roland's (2005) formula. The bars corre-
spond to the median Agreement Index and the whiskers span
the 95% condence intervals, calculated with the standard
errors from the distribution of annual Agreement Indices.

























































































































































































Figure 3: Standard Deviations for EP Party Group Ideal
Point Distributions. Standard deviations are plotted on the
y-axis and year on the x-axis. The bars represent the median
estimates and the whiskers the 95% Bayesian credible inter-
vals, all calculated using 1,000 samples of MEP ideal points
(by party group and year) from the posterior distributions.
33Figure 4: Predictions for National Party Eects Across Time:
Conservatives. Predicted absolute ideal point deviations
from the party group mean are plotted on the y-axis and year
is plotted on the x-axis. The curves represent the predicted
estimates from an OLS regression of absolute ideal point de-
viations from the party group mean on year, year-squared,
national party position and interactions between year and
national party position as well as year-squared and national
party position. The gray curves are the predictions for when
the national party position is set at the maximum for the
Conservatives (maximal support for the EU) and the black
curves for when the national party position is set at the min-
imum for the Conservatives (minimal support for the EU).
The middle black and gray curves are the mean predictions,
with the enveloping lines forming the 95% condence inter-
vals.
34Figure 5: Predictions for National Party Eects Across Time:
Socialists. Predicted absolute ideal point deviations from the
party group mean are plotted on the y-axis and year is plotted
on the x-axis. The curves represent the predicted estimates
from an OLS regression of absolute ideal point deviations
from the party group mean on year, year-squared, national
party position and interactions between year and national
party position as well as year-squared and national party po-
sition. The gray curves are the predictions for when the na-
tional party position is set at the maximum for the Socialists
(maximal support for the EU) and the black curves for when
the national party position is set at the minimum for the So-
cialists (minimal support for the EU). The middle black and
gray curves are the mean predictions, with the enveloping
lines forming the 95% condence intervals.
35Figure 6: Predictions for National Party Eects Across Time:
Liberals. Predicted absolute ideal point deviations from the
party group mean are plotted on the y-axis and year is plot-
ted on the x-axis. The curves represent the predicted es-
timates from an OLS regression of absolute ideal point de-
viations from the party group mean on year, year-squared,
national party position and interactions between year and
national party position as well as year-squared and national
party position. The gray curves are the predictions for when
the national party position is set at the maximum for the
Liberals (maximal support for the EU) and the black curves
for when the national party position is set at the minimum
for the Liberals (minimal support for the EU). The middle
black and gray curves are the mean predictions, with the en-
veloping lines forming the 95% condence intervals.
36Figure 7: Predictions for National Party Eects Across Time:
Greens. Predicted absolute ideal point deviations from the
party group mean are plotted on the y-axis and year is plotted
on the x-axis. The curves represent the predicted estimates
from an OLS regression of absolute ideal point deviations
from the party group mean on year, year-squared, national
party position and interactions between year and national
party position as well as year-squared and national party po-
sition. The gray curves are the predictions for when the na-
tional party position is set at the maximum for the Greens
(maximal support for the EU) and the black curves for when
the national party position is set at the minimum for the
Greens (minimal support for the EU). The middle black and
gray curves are the mean predictions, with the enveloping
lines forming the 95% condence intervals.
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